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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
lief to the stakeholder. The basis for its constitutionality also seems
sound.8 7 None the less, it is more advisable to proceed wherever
possible under Section 287 of the Civil Practice Act, or the Federal
Interpleader Act 8 not only because they have survived constitu-
tional tests, but because the relief thereunder is quicker; under the new
statute as much as one year might pass before a case is disposed of.89
At any rate, if the legislation proves as successful as it is hoped, the
Statute of Limitations will become an important weapon in the hands
of the Legislature with which it can overcome jurisdictional obstacles
in the courts. From the economic point of view, the statute should
be an important factor in relieving American businessmen of fear
and danger in doing business with foreign citizens.
SAMUEL M. SINGER.
THE UNCLAIMED LIFE INSURANCE FUNDS Acr.--The economic
plague has, for the last ten years, devastated the financial fields, con-
sumed all the fruits of prosperity investments, exhausted all accumu-
lated reserves and rendered unbearable the burden of the taxpayer.
It has constrained the legislatures to enact more and more revenue
legislation. The New York Legislature, in its quest for new modes
of taxation, has discovered a new source for revenue, the unclaimed
funds in the domestic life insurance corporations.
On June 17, 1939, Governor Lehman had the choice of signing
one of two bills I on the same subject. He signed the McNaboe bill,
which immediately became the law.2 The draftsmen, in planning the
bill, intended, to use the proverbial saying, to kill two birds with one
stone. Not only was the bill designed to alleviate the troublesome
details confronting the life insurance corporations in their safeguard-
ing the funds of forgetful policyholders,3 but also to add new income
to the coffers of the state treasury, and this, perhaps, was the pri-
mary purpose of the legislation. 4
87 See note 59, supra.
88 See note 3, supra.
89 See note 22, supra.
2The McNaboe bill (Senate No. 2896) and the Hampton bill (Senate
No. 2962), both imposing similar requirements on domestic life insurance cor-
porations, were presented to the Governor for signature. The Governor vetoed,
without memorandom, the Hampton bill.
2 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 923, §§ 295-299; N. Y. INs. LAW §§ 295-299; N. Y.
STATE FINAN CE LAW § 44-h.
3 According to Mr. Morris H. Siegel, the insurance counselor and director
of the Policyholders Advisory Council who helped prepare the bill, the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Corporation alone in its industrial department is holding
$250,000,000 in reserves on lapsed policies.
4 Mr. Siegel estimates that with the McNaboe bill the State of New York




In substance, this seemingly novel piece of legislation 5 requires
every insurer 6 to file with the Superintendent of Insurance, on or
before the tenth day of November in each year, a statement of un-
claimed or abandoned funds due to beneficiaries.7 In addition, the
insurers are to publish such statement, annually, in a newspaper 8
designated by the superintendent and to pay 9 over to the state comp-
troller, on or before April tenth of each year, all the funds unclaimed
for a definite period of time.1" The comptroller, upon receiving the
unclaimed funds, is directed to deposit three-fourths of the amount
thereof into the state treasury, to the credit of the general fund, and
to retain the remaining one-fourth as a special fund, which is to be
used for the payment of claims made by the persons to whom the
funds belong.' After paying an unclaimed fund to the comptroller,
and, thereafter, three to four million dollars each year. However, the insurance
companies warn the revenue-raisers that they are disillusioned, for there are no
vast sums to be garnered from unclaimed life insurance proceeds, and that they
are sure to be less and less. See EASTERN UNDERWRITER, May 26, 1939, p. 16.
5 Other states have endeavored to provide for the surrender of unclaimed
insurance funds to the state. -Mass. Gen. Laws 1921, p. 2381 made such pro-
vision, but this law was repealed by Mass. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 426.
6 The term "insurer" means and includes any domestic life insurance cor-
poration, or any person, partnership or association duly organized under the
laws of this state to transact life insurance business, or to grant, purchase or
dispose of annuities. It also includes any savings and insurance bank organized
under the laws of New York. See N. Y. INs. LAW § 295, subd. 1.
7 Id. § 296 (The report is to be verified by an officer of the insurer and
shall contain as to each unclaimed fund alphabetically (1) the full name of the
insured, his last post-office address and his number and his policy age; (2) the
amount due under the policy; and (3) the full name of each beneficiary and
his last known address).8 Id. § 297 ("Any amount paid to a newspaper for such publication may
be charged equally against the amounts owing to the persons whose names were
published but it shall be unlawful to make any other charges against such
amounts").
9 Id. § 298. By a communication of September 26, 1939, the writer has been
informed by Mr. Nathan R. Sobel, counsel to the Governor of New York and
one of the draftsmen of the Act, of the fact that he had learned that the life
insurance corporations, because of objections based on substantive legal ques-
tions, will refuse to turn over unclaimed funds to the state until ordered to do
so by the courts. Mr. Robert B. Bacon, the assistant attorney for the Asso-
ciation of Life Insurance Presidents, has likewise, in a communication of
August 29, 1939, apprised the writer of the fact that most of the life insurance
companies are already engaged in preparing test litigation to determine the
validity of this Act.
101d. § 295, subd. 2(a)-2(e) (Any funds, due and payable under a
matured policy, Which remain unclaimed for a period of at least seven years
from the date of maturity of such policy, are unclaimed funds. And the
reserve under an automatic non-forfeiture policy on which the premiums have
not been paid for at least five years and the insured has failed to notify the
insurer that he was aware of the continued operation of the policy by virtue of
the non-forfeiture clause, after the latter had requested him to do so on a
specified date, also constitutes an unclaimed fund).
II N. Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 44-h, subd. 1 ("Such special fund shall be
1939]
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the insurer is relieved from liability on the fund as to the amount of
such payment.12  However, such payment by an insurer does not
preclude the insured from filing, against the insurer, a claim in ex-
cess of the amount paid over to the comptroller.3
ii.
The courts have assiduously sustained the right of a state, to
take n asures to protect and conserve property within its jurisdic-
tion which has no known owner.' 4 The courts have also recognized
the power of a state to found proceedings for the escheat of property
upon the presumption' of death arising from the failure to locate the
owner or his living heirs.13 The statute under consideration is not
one of escheat, 6 for the Legislature, in authorizing the comptroller
to receive in payment the unclaimed funds, did not proceed on the
theory of "bona vacantid', i.e., that the insured had died leaving no
living heirs who could lawfully succeed to the fund.1T The Act does
not provide for the seizure of property presumed to be without an
owner, but rather for the transfer of possession of the unclaimed
deposited in one or more state banks, trust companies or savings banks. Any
interest received by the comptroller upon any deposit of unclaimed funds shall
be the property of the state").
12 N. Y. INS. LAW § 299.
13 Ibid. (In such a case, the insurer's liability is limited to the amount of
the excess, and the insured, if he wishes to recover the reserve under his policy
which has been paid to the comptroller as an unclaimed fund, must file a claim
for the same against the comptroller, who is granted full and complete authority
to accept or reject any such claim). N. Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 44-h, subd.
2 (If the comptroller rejects such a claim, the claimant may apply to the
supreme court, upon giving ten days' notice to the comptroller, "for an order to
show cause why the comptroller should not accept and pay any such rejected
claim").
14 Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 721(1905) ; Provident Institute for Savings v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 31 Sup. Ci
661 (1911), aff'g, 201 Mass. 23, 86 N. E. 912 (1909).
'
3 Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136(1910) ; Security Savings Bank v. State, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923).
16 Sands v. Lynham, 27 Gratt 291 (Va. 1876) (The word "escheat" is of
French or Norman derivation, meaning chance or accident); 19 Am. JtM.(1939) p. 380, § 2 ("In its most comprehensive scope escheat means the rever-
sion or forfeiture of property to the government upon the happening of some
chance, event or default") ; State v. Savings Union Bank & Trust Co., 186 Cal.
294, 199 Pac. 26 (1921) (Under the ancient English common law there were
two kinds of escheats-first, where the owner of land died, leaving no heirs so
that the land reverted to and vested in the king, who "was esteemed in the eye
of the law the original proprietor of all the lands in the kingdom"; second,
where the owner forfeited his land to the king by attainder for a felony or
treason. Thus, historically' it is incorrect to apply the term "escheat" to
personalty, but now the term is applied indiscriminately to all property aban-
doned and in want of persons entitled to make a legal claim thereto).
'7 Provident Institute for Savings v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 31 Sup. Ct.
661 (1911), aff'g, 201 Mass. 23, 86 N. E. 912 (1909).
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funds into "custodia leg&.s" 8  The payment of the funds to the comp-
troller is not in the nature of a statutory forfeiture of the funds to
the state.' 9 Although the state is allowed to use the greater part
of the funds for its own purposes, the statute is not intended solely
for the benefit of the state. It also contemplates the preservation of
the apparently abandoned funds on the general principle that corpo-
rations may become insolvent, or may be dissolved, or that after a
lapse of time changes may occur which would require someone to
look after the insured's rights.20
There can be no doubt that the Act is constitutional insofar as
it requires the filing of reports 2 1 with the superintendent, the pub-
lishing of notices 22 and the payment of unclaimed funds arising under
matured life insurance policies.23 To carry on the sale of life in-
surance is to engage in a public or quasi-public business.24 Such busi-
ness is bound to affect the commercial welfare and proprety interests
of individuals, and so must lend itself to the legislative regulation of
the state in the exercise of its police power.25 It is a settled rule that
corporations, as creatures of the state, are, in respect to their affairs,
subject to the laws of the creating state, unless such laws prevent
the attainment of the corporate ends.26 The regulation imposed by
the Act in reference to unclaimed proceeds on matured policies is
reasonable and in no way interferes with the life insurance corpora-
tions in their doing of business according to their charters.27
Moreover, the provisions of the Act referring to matured pol-
icies are constitutional irrespective of the doctrine of police power.
They are in harmony with the "due process" clauses of the federal
and state constitutions.2 They do not deprive the insured of his
18 It is a transfer to the sovereign state, which takes it in the capacity of a
conservator for the benefit-of any person lawfully entitled to it. See Security
Savings Bank v. State, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923) ; Commonwealth
v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 At1. 569 (1917).
19 Brown v. McPherson, 277 Mich. 396, 269 N. W. 211 (1936-).
20 Commonwealth v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 Atl. 569
(1917); Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682, 11 Sup. Ct. 222 (1891) (Indeed, the
disposition of property within its jurisdiction is a matter exclusively of state
cognizance).
21 N. Y. Izs. LAW § 296.
22 Id. §297.
23Id. §295, subds. 2(a), (d) and (e). See Commonwealth v. Dollar
Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 AtI. 569 (1917).
24 Bean v. Stoddard, 238 N. Y. 581, 144 N. E. 900 (1924) ; People v. Loew,
19 Misc. 248, 44 N. Y. Supp. 42 (1896).25 Brunstein v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 255 N. Y. 137, 174 N. E. 304
(1931); People ex rel. Moore v. Holmes, 151 App. Div. 257, 135 N. Y. Supp.
467 (4th Dept. 1912).
26 First Nat. Bank of San Jose v. State, 262 U. S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 602
(1923) ; First Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 44 Sup. Ct. 213 (1923).
27 Provident Institute for Savings v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 31 Sup. Ct.
661 (1911), aff'g, 201 Mass. 23, 86 N. E. 912 (1909) ; Security Savings Bank
v. State, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923).
28 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall deprive "any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law") ; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I,
1939 ]
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property without due process. The owner of the find is not deprived
of any right of ownership, for as soon as his fund is transferred to
the state he is afforded an action against the state where, without
a limitation of time, he or his lawful representatives may identify
themselves and prove their claim.20  Similarly, no property rights
of the insurers are invaded under these provisions. They may argue
that the provisions will work a deprivation of the property rights
which they have in the funds by denying them the opportunity of
earning profits concomitant with the possession of such funds.30 In
reply to this argument it may be said that the contracts of insurance
do not create anything in the nature of a tontine right,3 ' under which,
upon the dissolution of a corporation, the then policyholders would
share in the disposition of the funds of those absent and unknown.
32
Furthermore, these provisions,3 3 although retroactive in applica-
tion, and pertaining to all unclaimed funds arising under matured
policies even though the policies were taken out prior to the enact-
ment of the Act,34 do not abrogate any existing contracts. 35 In sell-
ing an insurance policy, the insurer agrees to pay the sum stipulated
therein upon its maturity. When the policy matures, it becomes an
executed contract as far as the insured is concerned and there only
remains a duty on the insurer to pay the stipulated sum to the bene-
ficiary.30 But the beneficiary cannot be found, and so the state steps
in and collects the due sum as a trustee of the missing owner. This
procedure violates no rights of the insurer since it has no tontine right
to the fund, and the state may take the fund as a conservator, as we
have seen. To hold otherwise would be to support a proposition that
the contract of insurance was made to continue for all time, even if
the owner of the benefice under the policy should die without lawful
heirs, so that his property would become subject to escheat.3 7
There is nothing unequal or discriminatory in confining the ap-
plication of this Act to unclaimed funds in life insurance corpora-
§ 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law") ; N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 7, subd. (a) ("Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation"). See Cunnius v.
Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 721 (1905).
29 N. Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 44-h, subds. 2 and 3.
30 State v. Security Savings Bank, 154 Pac. 1070 (Cal. App. 1915).
31 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) 1161 ("In French Law a species
of association or partnership formed among persons who are in receipt of per-
petual or life annuities, with the agreement that the shares or annuities of
those who die shall accrue to the survivors. This plan is said to be thus named
from Tonti, an Italian, who invented it in the seventeenth century").
32 Security Savings Bank v. State, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923).
33 N. Y. INs. LAW §§ 295, subds. 2(a), (b) and (e), 296 and 297.
34 Id. §§295, subds. 2(a), (d) and (e) and 298.
5 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall * * * pass any * * *
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts * * * ").
36 Sliosberg v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (1927).
37 Malone v. Provident Institute for Savings, 201 Mass. 23, 86 N. E. 912
(1909), aft'd, 221 U. S. 660, 31 Sup. Ct. 661 (1911); Brown v. McPherson,
277 Mich. 396, 269 N. W. 211 (1936).
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tions.3s This fact alone does not subject the Act to the objection
that it is "special legislation". 39 In view of the "relation which it
bears to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues of the state"
the state is justified in making classification segregating life insurance
corporations from the general law applicable to corporations.
40
However, the Act presents a serious question in its application
to unclaimed funds belonging to persons residing in foreign juris-
dictions.4 1 The question may be posed as to whether the state may
validly take into its custody unclaimed funds belonging to insureds
holding policies of domestic life insurance corporations, but domiciled
in other states. It is a universal rule that a state has no power over
property outside its jurisdiction.42 Since intangible property, such
as debts, have no territorial situs,4 3 under the maxim, "mobilia
sequlntur personarn" it follows its owner,44 and, consequently, the
domicile of the owner of such property has jurisdiction over it.45 Un-
claimed funds held by life insurance corporations are not property in
the hands of the corporations, but rather they are debts or obliga-
tions of the insurers. 46 Thus, it may be argued that funds, as in-
tangible property, follow the creditor, the beneficiary, into his domi-
cile, and, therefore, New York could have no jurisdiction over funds
belonging to residents of another state. However, it is to be observed
that it is the power of control over the res, rather than situs which
gives a state jurisdiction over it.4T Situs is only important inasmuch
as it is an aid to the state in controlling property.48 In reality, the
domicile of the debtor may also have control over the intangible
property of a foreign creditor. 49 The domicile of the debtor has con-
trol over the debtor inasmuch as it may compel the debtor to pay
the debt in an action brought by the creditor to recover the debt, and
indirectly, therefore, it has control over the debt.50
The Supreme Court of the United States has been somewhat
inconsistent in respect to the doctrine of "mobilia sequuntur per-
3s Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71, 108 Atl. 441 (1919).
39Ibid. (Frazer, J., said: "* * * Classification is a legislative question,
subject to judicial revision only so far as to see [sic] it is founded on real
distinctions in subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used
for the purpose of evading the constitutional prohibition. If the distinctions
are genuine, the courts cannot declare the classification void, though they may
not consider it as resting upon a sound basis. The test is not wisdom, but good
faith in the classification").
40 State ex rel. Powell v. State Bank, 90 Mont. 539, 4 P. (2d) 717 (1931).
41 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 (1917).
42 Ibid.
43 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499 (1907).
-4 Ibid.
45 Ibid. See Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for thw Purposes of Ad-
ministration, Garnishment and Taxation (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 905, 906.
4H Liverpool Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499 (1907).
47 Carpenter, op. cit. supra note 45, at 907.
4s Ibid.
-9 State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds Case, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872).
50 Ibid.
1939)]
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sonaa".51  At present the court is disposed to hold that both the
debtor's as well as the creditor's domiciles may have jurisdiction
over intangible property.5 2
III.
Unfortunately, however, the Act is ostentatiously defective in one
respect. Insofar as the Act provides that, after an insurer notifies a
policyholder in a case where a policy continues in force by virtue of
its automatic non-forfeiture provision, and the insured fails to inform
the insurer within a specified time that he has knowledge of such a
non-forfeiture provision, "such policy will be terminated after such
specified date, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of this chap-
ter or of the insurance policy,53 it is void. 54 This is a retroactive
feature of the Act which, it is submitted, dooms that'particular por-
tion.5 r5 This provision is not intended to furnish counsel or advice
as to what conditions may be incorporated into life insurance policies
to be made in the future. On the contrary the Act applies to con-
tracts now in force. In this respect it is deliberately calculated to
modify and reform existing contracts.5 7 It revises all life insurance
contracts running under the automatic non-forfeiture provisions so
as to effect an elimination of their insurance features unless the policy-
holders do something, which, under the terms of the contract, they
have never obligated themselves to do. It was not the desire to al-
leviate conditions evincing want of understanding between the parties
to the insurance contracts, nor to clarify ambiguous provisions in
the contracts that the Legislature claims to be justified in drastically
reforming existing contracts.5 8  The Legislature, in attempting to
justify its action, seeks shelter in the stronghold of the public policy
doctrine.59 One but wonders whether the drastic modifications of
definite existing contracts in tranquil and peaceful times, when no
51 Carpenter, op. cit. supra note 45, at 905. See also Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930).
52 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 350, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939); Graves v.
Elliot, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939). See (1939) 14 ST. JoHN's L.
Rav. -, for a discussion of these cases.
53 N. Y. INS. LAW § 295, subd. 2(a).
54 Ramey v. Pyles, 182 Ark. 320, 31 S. W. (2d) 533 (1930).
55 Standard Chem. & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chem. Corp., 231 N. Y. 51,
131 N. E. 566 (1921); Lewis v. Dunlop, 112 S. C. 544, 100 S. E. 170 (1919).
56 N. Y. INs. LAw § 295, subd. 2(b).
57 Standard Chem. & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chem. Corp., 231 N. Y. 51,
131 N. E. 566 (1921).
58 Ibid. See WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, Sept 16, 1939, p. 539.
59 N. Y. STATE FINANcE LAw § 44-h, subd. 3 (wherein these significant
words appear: "It is hereby declared to be against sound public policy to permit
policies to operate under their non-forfeiture provisions for a period of more
than five years without affirmative evidence of knowledge on the part of the




public emergency calls, will not subject sound public policy to a
greater danger than it may possibly be subjected to under non-
forfeiture policies operating without the insureds going to the trouble
of notifying the insurers of their knowledge of such operation.60
Undoubtedly, it is high time that something be done with the
unclaimed funds held by the life insurance corporations, and it is
advisable that the state be the one to profit from such funds when
the insured or his representatives cannot be located. Nevertheless,
the end does not justify the means. Sound reasoning and honesty
demand that the phrase "unclaimed funds" should not be confused
with the reserves for insurance that is operating in accordance with
an existing contract. Legislative fiat may not arbitrarily abrogate
existing contracts. 6 The fundamentals of constitutional government
do not condone strong-arm methods of abrogating existing contracts. 2
Thus, unless the court finds that sound public policy requires
the particular provisions under consideration, they would probably
be held unconstitutional. However, these provisions, if found to be
invalid, would not vitiate the Act in its entirety. The invalid part
would be severable from the valid portion of the Act, and so the
lawful part would subsist even though the invalid part would meet
a judicial death.6
EDWARD S. SZUKELEWICZ.
60 See WEEKLY UND~waRREa, Sept. 16, 1939, p. 539.61 Standard Chem. & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chem. Corp., 231 N. Y. 51,
131 N. E. 566 (1921).
O2 Ibid.
63 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 850 (1886). Indeed, the
Legislature itself declared that if any part of the Act be adjudged unconstitu-
tional, such judgment shall be confined only to such invalid portion of the Act,
"and the legislature hereby declares that it would have enacted this act without
such invalid part, provision or application if the validity thereof had been
apparent." N. Y. STATE FiXANcE LAW § 44-h, subd. 4.
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